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Authenticity, Right Relation and the Return of the 
Repressed Native in James Galvin’s The Meadow
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This essay reads acclaimed poet James Galvin’s 1992 semi-
autobiographical novel through the lenses of Martin Heidegger’s 
notion of authenticity and Patrick Wolfe’s discussion of settler-
colonialism. I argue that Lyle, arguably the novel’s main character, 
is portrayed as living “authentically” in contrast to the deep 
inauthenticity of Ferris. I connect Western authentic dwelling 
with settler-colonial logic, centering my account on the figures 
of the “lazy” and “magical” “Indian.” Ultimately, I find that far 
from rejecting settler-colonial logic Galvin’s text plays out of a 
return of the repressed of the present absence of indigenous persons 
in the land and the text. Keywords: James Galvin, Heidegger, 
settler colonialism, indigeneity, right relation, place and space, the 
American West.
In the Great American Indian novel, when it is finally 
written, all of the white people will be Indians and all of the 
Indians will be ghosts. 
 –Sherman Alexie
Although there has not been a great deal of scholarship on it, James 
Galvin’s semi-autobiographical novel The Meadow has had a place in the 
university classroom for some time. It is often read alongside the likes of 
Ivan Doig’s This House of Sky, the work of Wallace Stegner, William Kittredge, 
Terry Tempest Williams, Judy Blunt and others in literature classes that 
focus on Western United States writing of place. In fact, my first encounter 
with The Meadow was in an undergraduate course I took with Leon “Pete” 
Sinclair at the Evergreen State College, a fact that leads me to say that 
Galvin’s novel has been at least on the margins of academe virtually since 
its 1992 publication. For this reason, among others, a sustained look Galvin’s 
novel is a worthwhile undertaking. In concert with the appearance and 
rise of Western Studies within the American academy and the subsequent 
academic interest in Western writing, an American cultural investment in 
the U.S. West as a place and space of meaning(s) remains very much in 
effect. This is perhaps most evident in the tremendous growth in population 
in the Western United States in the past thirty years or so. 
It is in both of these contexts, academic and social, that I propose to 
examine Galvin’s text. I aim at two points here. The first is that the kind 
of authentic “right relation” to the land that we find in The Meadow and 
which is reflective of the appeal of the American West as imagined place, 
as a cultural construct, to many white Americans can be understood in 
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terms of twentieth century philosopher Martin Heidegger’s thought. 
The second is that this trope of authenticity is the result of the cultural 
psychology of what Patrick Wolfe and others call the paradigm of settler 
colonialism. Indeed as I shall argue such authenticity is predicated on the 
forced removal of Indigenous peoples, and their consequent near absence, 
while it at the same time plays out settler-colonial anxiety of that removal 
in a deeply troubling fashion. 
I argue then that The Meadow trades on a specific type of authenticity, 
one that the mainstream and usually white culture of the contemporary 
intermountain West finds itself largely in comportment with. The notion of 
“authenticity” has of course been highly charged in humanistic discourse 
since at least the 1980s, although such discourse focuses on racial and 
cultural understandings of authenticity. I speak here of a related conception 
of authenticity, one that like assumptions of cultural authenticity serves 
to draw what Hayden White calls a horizontal line between cultural 
formations1, but that is at the same time of a broader scope: the authenticity 
of the right relation to the natural world as a reaction to modernity that gets 
played out in very interesting and problematic ways in the American West, 
especially when seen in terms of the paradigm of settler-colonialism.
In their introduction to True West: Authenticity and the American West, 
William Handley and Nathaniel Lewis deploy the concept of authenticity 
as it relates to what we might call the ideology of the West, or at least the 
white ideology of the West. True West primarily concerns itself with two 
variations on Western authenticity, the first being what constitutes the “real 
West” against the creeping “fake West.” The real West is seen as, basically, 
one of cowboys, Indians, miners, shoot-outs, etc.: the mythic Wild West 
with which we are all too familiar. This mythic Wild West is in opposition to 
the fake West of—let us say for example—the dude ranch or the ranchette.2 
The other conception of authenticity mobilized in True West is concerned 
with American Indian cultural and racial authenticity. This notion of racial 
or cultural authenticity has been perhaps the dominant object of study 
in the humanities situated as it is at the crux of structural racism, identity 
politics, cultural autonomy and the like. We humanists remain in the 
process of critiquing the kind of essentialism that such cultural authenticity 
plays on. Authenticity in the sense in which I shall use it, however, does 
not rightly belong either in or to the discourses that Handley and Lewis 
work with, although as my epigraph from Alexie’s poem “How to Write the 
Great American Indian Novel” suggests, a certain spectral yet absolutely 
crucial residue of the question of Indigenous authenticity remains, a fact I 
will discuss at the end of the present essay. 
The authenticity I query here then is less a social phenomenon or a 
mythic one, although it has aspects of both, than it is an ideological and 
philosophical one. Authenticity as I use it in this paper has to do with idea 
of a correct way of living in accordance with nature, the environment, the 
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world. This authenticity rests on a version of what I will call, in a nod to 
feminist Christian theologian Mary C. Grey, the “right relation.”3 The right 
relation is both an ecological and a cultural comportment; it is the “proper” 
and non-exploitative way of interacting with the natural world. Perhaps no 
other modern philosopher has devoted as much time to thinking through 
these issues as Martin Heidegger. Despite Heidegger’s unfortunate politics, 
and as the recent publication of certain portions of the so-called Black 
Notebooks clearly show that those politics were both deeply ingrained 
and fraught with racism, his thought can help us to shed a brighter light 
on the issue of authenticity.4 In Heideggerian terms, and more precisely 
the terms of Heidegger’s seminal Sein und Zeit (hereafter S&Z), known 
as Being and Time in English, authenticity is an authenticity of being (not 
of Being); it is the authentic way of what Heidegger calls “being-in-the-
world.” I will argue that Galvin and Heidegger have a similar perception 
or sensibility about the world, one which will allow us to look a little more 
deeply into The Meadow. Beyond merely noting a concordance though, I 
want to address what I consider to be the ultimate effect of this notion of 
authenticity in the context of the settler colonial subconscious in terms of 
what appears to be an absence of any concern with Indigenous peoples in 
The Meadow. Ultimately we will find that while the absence of the native 
in the text follows the logic of settler colonialism in the most obvious way, 
that same logic has a very interesting residue or trace it seems to leave on 
the text.
Lyle’s Authenticity in “The Meadow”
As noted above, The Meadow is a fictionalized account of its author’s life 
as a rancher on the Wyoming/Colorado border. It tells a multigenerational 
story that centers on the titular meadow, tracking the meadow’s owners 
and visitors through many decades. The main story centers on Lyle Van 
Waring, the meadow’s fourth owner, and the narrator’s (named “Jim,” 
and a fictionalized version of Galvin himself) interactions with Lyle. Lyle 
is quite aged by the time Jim renews their relationship (Jim returns to the 
ranching life after being away for some time), and in some ways the novel’s 
central theme is Jim’s grief at Lyle’s death. More important than this central 
theme, however, is the novel’s worldview. Few books, including Stegner’s 
meditations on the value of life in the rural West, more elegantly portray 
the Western notion of authenticity than does The Meadow. 
At the heart of The Meadow then is a dichotomy, a binary correlation. 
This binary is not strict—it has many gradations—but it nonetheless 
undergirds the narrative. This dichotomy shows itself most obviously in 
the characters of Lyle on the one hand and Ferris on the other. Lyle is in an 
authentic, right relation with the land—and possibly the world—and Ferris 
typifies the opposite. Ferris is blight personified, a man with no sense of 
authenticity of being, which is to say that at first glance, he is a “thoroughly 
modern” man. If the meadow itself is the geographic and spiritual locus of 
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the book, the relationship that Lyle maintains with it, one of respect and 
stewardship, forms the instantiation of the authentic right relation. Ferris, 
positioned as he is on the barren ridge top above the meadow, makes a 
mockery of that relation. Not only does he lay his land to waste, as we shall 
see, but he shows his ignorance in his choice of land in the first place: it is 
simply not fit for habitation. In the meadow life is hard, but with respect 
and care, both a person and the land may be maintained. This is clearly 
not the case for the land Ferris occupies, and it is a crucial point. Ferris, 
although we are never privy to his thoughts, seems to understand his land 
not in terms of relationship, of wise use, but in terms of exploitation. Like 
William’s Cronon’s subtle mockery of southern Californian housing in the 
opening salvo of Uncommon Ground’s “In Search of Nature,” Ferris’ selection 
of property in terms of its capacity to provide a desirable location is pure 
folly. This, of course, is because he does not understand the land, and more 
specifically because he does not understand that it is not space but place.  
Lyle sees things differently, and the meadow is nothing if not a place in 
the richest sense of that term. This place-ness, the capacity for rootedness, 
or as the later Heidegger might call it “dwelling,” rests in turn on the 
possibility of a relationship.5 That is the meadow as a dwelling place is to 
be understood in terms of its ability to develop and sustain a relationship 
between human and the flora, fauna, and terrain of that specific plot 
of land. This foregrounding of what we might call an ethical relation 
clearly valorizes both the meadow itself as dwelling place and even more 
importantly, it valorizes Lyle himself.6
As the novel begins, Galvin writes in a key bit of foreshadowing that 
Lyle “lived so close to the real world it almost let him in” (4). This phrase 
can usefully be seen as the book’s program statement. Lyle, of course, lives 
in the meadow. The meadow then is cast as the real world; it is figure for the 
reality of the natural world that surrounds us. Lyle lives in the real world 
when he lives in the meadow, and what this means and what readers are 
to note is that Lyle is the type of person who knows how to live in the real 
world, how to live authentically as it were. This meadow is not available 
to all; one has to be in relation, the proper—even ideal—relation to the 
world to live in it and to be “almost” let in.  Everything in Lyle’s life, except 
his relationships with people is, in a sense, perfect. In the narrator Jim’s 
“first dream,” this fact is noted: “Here’s the first dream: Lyle is still Lyle, still 
driving the ’59 Studebaker that sounds more like it runs on an electric motor 
that a gasoline one it’s tuned so fine, but you can tell it’s a dream when he 
drive it into Denver” (9). Already the reader sees that Lyle is a master of 
the right relation, of authenticity. Lyle would never dream of letting his car 
fall into decrepitude, in fact he could not allow it. Note how the perfectly 
running engine is not part of the dream, but a part of reality. The narrator as 
much as says here that he is not idealizing Lyle, that Lyle really is the kind 
of man who keeps a thirty year old engine in perfect condition. 
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But this first dream gives the reader more than just snapshot of Lyle’s 
authenticity; it sets up that same authenticity as in contrast to modernity, 
to waste, and ultimately to Ferris. It is the same modernity that is the target 
of the novel’s central critique, and as such Ferris’ role is just as important 
as Lyle’s. In fact, in addition to depicting Lyle’s basic comportment to the 
world—concerning nature, machines, and work—that dream also works as 
foreshadowing of his death later in the book. Evident too in the first dream 
is the pastoral function which the meadow itself, and by proxy its occupant 
Lyle, serve for the narrator and for the reader. Indeed, Galvin is a bit 
heavy-handed when the dream juxtaposes authentic, right relation-ed Lyle 
entering the Denver metroplex with the imagery of tape measures gone 
awry. In the dream, Galvin writes, “[t]he pickup is loaded down with tape 
measures of many sizes, all sprung out of their cases. …We start unloading 
them, but we can’t because we are cutting our hands to shreds…. Then 
we are both crying because we can’t get the tapes out and Lyle doesn’t 
understand the directions for getting out of the city” (9). Denver as modern 
metropolis, Lyle’s lostness in it, and the symbolism of tape measures — 
tools of measuring and portioning run out of control — all clearly point to a 
world, to a Being, that is out of control as well. For the narrator and for the 
reader, the meadow and Lyle’s relation to it are the panaceas for this life out 
of control. As Jim the narrative voice tells us: “I want to go to Sheep Creek 
[the meadow], too, but I can’t because of all these tape measures, different 
sizes, too heavy to lift, too sharp to touch without slicing my fingers” (10). 
The Sheep Creek meadow is a haven for Jim, an almost Edenic place that 
exists just out of reach of the fractured modern world. And Lyle is a solitary 
Adam, a Rousseauvian noble savage living in harmony with his world. And 
this image should be familiar to us; it is the dominant fantasy of white life in 
the West. It is the cowboy, the ethical rancher, and of course the romanticized 
“magical Indian:” a figure to which I will return later. Crucially though, 
as becomes clear later in the novel, this capacity for authenticity that Lyle 
demonstrates is not to be understood as fantastical. His authenticity is not a 
dream. Nor are readers to think of Lyle’s specific right relation as something 
of limited practical value. We could all stand, the novel tells us, to be a lot 
more like Lyle. So what is Lyle like?
He is not a Luddite as we saw with the finely tuned engine above, but 
he shuns most of the mod cons. When his machines do break, he fixes them 
rather than buying a new one. Of Lyle’s tractor, Galvin writes approvingly, 
“whenever it broke, Lyle fixed it—even if he had to forge a part himself, up 
in the shop, right in the middle of haying” (16). The reasoning here is not so 
much to do with a refusal of technology but with a certain kind of harmonious 
practicality that flaunts itself in the face of the modern era of disposability, 
planned obsolesce, and what Marx identified as the commodity fetish. By 
way of introducing what will become a more thorough analysis below, let 
us look at this passage through a Heideggerian lens. In terms from S&Z Lyle 
understands tools and machinery in their equipmentality, their pragmatic 
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contextual position in terms of what they do. This is what Heidegger 
calls in S&Z Zuhandenheit or ready-to-handedness and it is itself crucially 
predicated on what he calls the referential totality of the worldhood of the 
world as I will discuss in a little more depth below. For now though, let us 
note that on this Heideggerian understanding equipment is not understood 
in terms of its capacity to do things but instead in the context of its relation 
to the world at large. In S&Z then Heidegger opposes the ontologicality 
of Zuhandenheit to the “onticity” of Vorhandenheit or presence-at-hand, the 
latter being instrumental means/end thinking. As Heidegger puts it in the 
late essay “The Question Concerning Technology,” that instrumental logic 
is the logic of technology which explains technology’s “essence” as that 
which “enframes” (Gestell).
Lyle then sees in terms of equipment and not technology, in terms 
of the authentic ontological comportment of Zuhandenheit instead of the 
inauthentic ontic comportment of Vorhandenheit: “Lyle began to develop a 
philosophy of technology that had to do with whatever method did the 
best job, not like the rest of the culture he lived in, using the methods that 
were fastest” (55). While Galvin uses the term technology, Lyle’s pragmatic 
orientation, his concern with what works best, is the mark of someone not 
caught up in the enframing means/end thinking of what Heidegger calls 
technology. It may appear that Lyle values only efficiency, an approach that 
might indicate a certain instrumentality, however it is clear that efficiency is 
not what is truly at stake. When we see the words “did the best job” in this 
passage, this resolutely does not mean something like “the method that uses 
the least effort to get the job done.” Instead it means to do the job right; to 
do it correctly; to do it authentically. And such authenticity is immediately 
juxtaposed to its other—the modern world. Lyle’s authentic approach is 
“not like [that of] the rest of the culture he lived in.” This juxtaposition is a 
crux for the novel—a key to the sensibility of authenticity in The Meadow. 
Lyle’s way of doing, his very way of being, is contrasted to modern society 
or culture here well before his foil Ferris arrives on the scene to illustrate 
much the same thing. Authenticity of being, the right relation, does not 
exist in modern “culture” in the purview of The Meadow, and of course it 
is this fact that forms the basis of the novel’s developing elegiac tone. The 
Meadow mourns the loss of the right relation; the loss of authenticity of 
being and this mourning is its center.
Just before the passage quoted above, Lyle’s building technique is 
discussed at some length. Galvin writes, “He drilled and pegged the logs 
together the old way because they couldn’t afford spikes; only the roof 
boards and shingles had nails. But he found it a good way to build. Not as 
fast, but pegged walls are stronger than spiked, even if you could afford 
the spikes and the trips to town to get them” (55). Economy here plays 
some role in Lyle’s methods but in fact we suspect that he wouldn’t have 
purchased the spikes even if he had the money to do so. This suspicion is 
played out much later in this passage in which Jim the narrator asks, “What 
the hell is that?” Lyle answers, “A saw”:
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“What kind of saw?”
“For cutting a wooden wheel. It cuts a perfect circle.”
“What do want to make a wooden wheel for?”
“A wheelbarrow.”
I knew better than to ask why Lyle didn’t just slide down to the True 
Value and get himself one with a nice rubber wheel. [Emphasis 
added] (200)
The narrator does not actually tell us why he knows better than to ask but 
by this point we know all too well; it is not a matter of poverty or stinginess 
on Lyle’s part, nor is it a matter of doing the best job. Instead it is a matter 
of authenticity. Lyle does not buy commodities—he makes tools even when 
the making is less efficient than the buying would be. As Jim puts it, “So he 
[Lyle] stayed with the old methods and became a master builder with logs,” 
(55) and a master maker of tools we might add. Of course what is unwritten 
in all this, and what lies not too deeply under the surface, is that Lyle’s 
insistence on a kind of unalienated labor is rather strange in the context of 
this modern world. To a certain extent, then, Galvin doesn’t simply valorize 
the occasionally grouchy Lyle’s authenticity and right relation. In fact, in a 
section concerned with the meadow’s first owner App Worster, Galvin notes 
in what amounts to a reversal of a well-known passage from Walden “that 
the price of independence is slavery” (11).7 For both App and Lyle, life in 
the meadow, which is nothing other than a life of authentic independence, 
is a life of—if not slavery—indentured servitude. It is avowedly not a life 
of ease despite the fact that Galvin heavily romanticizes it. We must note 
though that this servitude is master-less one, and that while App and Lyle 
and Frank must work and work and work until death, still this work is both 
fulfilling and to them, and even more crucially an object lesson in authentic 
living.
Galvin is doing his best here to make it clear that the right relation does 
not guarantee happiness. Indeed, insanity caused by isolation must be 
feared by those who live in too close to the “real world,” as the story of Lyle’s 
sister Clara tells us.8 Life in the meadow and places like it, says Galvin, is not 
easy. But there is little doubt that he shows that this difficult life is, if done 
correctly, an authentic way of being. Work, struggle, and resoluteness in the 
face of trouble: these are the values heralded in The Meadow and they are of 
course the mythic values of the “authentic” West.
Heidegger, Authenticity, and the American West
They are also reminiscent of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. In 
S&Z Heidegger sets up a number of roughly equivalent binary structures, 
a few of which we have already seen: ontological and ontic, authentic 
and inauthentic, ready-to-hand and present-to-hand, existential and 
“existentiell.” For the present analysis though, what is important are the 
meanings of authentic and inauthentic. 
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Heidegger is perhaps most famous as the founding father of 
Existentialism, that once mighty and presently mostly irrelevant branch 
of so-called continental philosophy. It is not his existentialism per se that 
I find useful in Heidegger however. Some contemporary philosophers 
based in the United States are leading a charge to reclaim the value of 
some of Heidegger’s thought which does not fit under the rubric of what 
we—perhaps stereotypically—think of as existentialism. Among these 
thinkers are Hubert Dreyfus, Albert Borgmann, and Mark Wrathall. These 
men champion a portion of Heidegger’s thinking that is subtler and 
somewhat more difficult to understand than the Kierkegaardian notions 
of angst and the authentic relation toward death and which has informed 
later Existentialist thinkers such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus. 
This Kierkegaardian strand of Heidegger’s work is evident in the second 
Division of S&Z. Tellingly, Dreyfus’ book-length explication of Being and 
Time—entitled Being in the World: Division I—does not even address Division 
II of S&Z. What Dreyfus and Borgmann are interested in is Heidegger’s 
conception of Being and the question of Being.
Heidegger begins S&Z, in a habit that he will never quite shake, with 
a very extensive “introduction” that in fact works through the text’s main 
concerns in thumbnail form. Put simply, Heidegger addresses three primary 
points in S&Z. First we have what he calls the question of Being, meaning 
that Heidegger seeks to reclaim the importance of asking questions about 
Being, that which is closest to us but ever distant. This is the project of 
Heideggerian ontology.  Heidegger’s lifelong complaint against Western 
philosophy and what he calls metaphysics is that it ignores this question as 
unimportant, either because Being is taken for universal and thus not worth 
delving into, or that Being is “indefinable,” or that Being is self-evident 
and transparent (22-23). The bulk of Division I of S&Z then is devoted to a 
detailed and complicated analysis of Being-in-the-world as a way to begin 
to open up this question of Being. This is the thought that is experiencing 
a resurgence today. Heidegger’s second main goal is an explication of the 
role of Time and temporality in Being. As he writes, at least in his early 
thought, “time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever 
of Being” (1). Finally, this combination of an examination and disclosure of 
everyday Being and its horizon in time are meant to lead into the question 
of the meaning of Being, or in a more prosaic formulation, the meaning of 
life. 
But it is Heidegger’s discussion of Being in S&Z as well as his later, 
more mystical work, which may help us to query The Meadow further. Put 
simply, Heidegger thinks philosophy has gone wrong in that it privileges 
theory over life.9 Heidegger’s great contribution to philosophy then was 
a particular brand of holism that he called Being-in-the-world. By this 
being-in-the-world Heidegger meant that what we are, our very Being as it 
actually is, is not outside or above or somehow different from the world but 
a part of it and indeed wholly reliant upon it. Heidegger pulls the rug out 
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from under the dualism of mind and world and all the aporias it has caused 
then by rethinking our relation to the world.
This rethinking is done in a variety of ways, perhaps most famously 
in his discussion of equipment and the referential totality and it is in the 
context of this discussion that Heidegger’s discussion of Zuhandenheit and 
Vorhandenheit occur. Very basically, Heidegger poses that we understand 
things by how we relate to them, and that we do so in our Being primordially 
and not in thought or in theory. Equipment and tools are defined by what 
they do. And this definition rather than being simply instrumental serves 
to “open up” (Heidegger’s terminology) the referential totality of the world. 
For each hammer there is the nail it must hit, the work it does, and how this 
work plays out in the everyday world. The hammer’s being, then, is not 
that of an object but that of a reference. This reference shows the interplay 
of the entirety of the world, or as Heidegger calls it, the worldhood of the 
world. Our interaction with this world is primordial, it is the ground-state of 
our ontological Being; it is existence such as it is and the referential totality 
of the world that is revealed by and in this existence in a very basic way. 
Being to Heidegger, then, comes before theory, before thought, and is the 
very foundation of what a human (Heidegger uses the German compound 
Dasein or “being-there” for human) being is.
In Albert Borgmann’s words what we have at play here is both a kind 
of “radicality” and a kind of “concreteness” in Heidegger’s thought. The 
radicality is the reformulation of central philosophical ideas, Cartesian 
dualism in particular, and the disclosing of an entirely different way 
of thinking about how we exist in the world to that of modernity. The 
concreteness shows itself in Heidegger’s concern with the average everyday 
world and its artifacts and trappings.10 So, we might say, Heidegger uses 
concreteness, everyday living, to instantiate his radical reconsideration of 
Being. And that reconsideration is itself a reaction to modernity.
That reaction is perhaps most evident in S&Z’s concern with authenticity 
and inauthenticity. For Dasein to live inauthentically, is to live embroiled 
in society, in what Heidegger calls “the they”(das Man) and is subject to 
society’s opinions and trends rather than comported to the world in a 
“circumspect” manner. Authenticity is to not get caught up in what he calls 
“idle talk,” “curiosity,” and “ambiguity.” These three typify what Heidegger 
thought of his contemporary society: that it was full of people who talked 
on and on about “the big issues” with little or no circumspection, relying on 
endless “facts” to back them up; that a facile kind of surface level curiosity 
fed this sort of idle talk; and that irony, or ambiguity, or the inability to 
be resolute was a creeping symptom of this. Inauthenticity then is typified 
by immersion in fast-paced, technological modern life, which seeks to 
relentlessly bring every thing “close,” thus obliterating a circumspective 
understanding of the referential totality of the world. 
Why would Dasein live inauthentically? As a way of avoiding angst. Dasein 
is special in the sense that it is concerned with its own death. This concern 
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with her own being makes the question of Being as such, that is the question 
of why there are such things as Being and its opposite Nothing, primary to 
her—even if she is not aware of its primacy. According to the Heidegger of 
S&Z, the awareness of the eventuality of our own deaths manifests as angst 
which in turn essentially structures the human experience. There are two 
different reactions that a human being might have to this angst. The first—
the inauthentic—is to ignore angst, to put off considering one’s mortality by 
immersing oneself in the shallow social interactions of “idle talk” and “the 
they.” The authentic path is a more difficult one. It is predicated on facing 
and accepting the fact of one’s own death and the angst it produces in a 
“resolute” fashion. To do so, again according to Heidegger, opens one up to 
one’s authentic selfhood, an opening up which in turn leads to a fuller and 
more fully authentic engagement in life and the world. Note the similarities 
to Lyle’s life in the meadow here. Just as in The Meadow, Heidegger’s path of 
authenticity is not an easy one. It involves hard work, physical for Lyle and 
emotional for Heidegger. And both of these valences carry with them more 
than a hint of the heroic struggle against modernity, a struggle that below 
will be shown to be deeply tied to notions of place and pre-modernity. 
What is implied, if not yet explicitly stated, in S&Z concerning 
inauthenticity of Being is an opposition that Heidegger poses based on 
a sensibility about the world. Authenticity of Being is a certain type of 
circumspect comportment to the world that is at its base a nostalgic, 
romanticized ruralism. Heidegger’s examples often consist of simple 
tools, artisanal imagery, agrarian references (farmhouses, etc.), and a 
subtle but nonetheless present valorization of rural life. What Heidegger 
actually means, I argue, when he uses authenticity and inauthenticity of 
Being, is a particular “simpler” way of living that has been romanticized 
for hundreds of years. Authenticity of being-in-the-world can be usefully 
seen as something very similar to Marx’s idea of unalienated labor. Doing 
our work in a concerned, circumspective, simple, resolute, unalienated 
fashion—this is authentic Being. So too is a thoughtful separation from 
society, living in time with the seasons, and so on. Heidegger finds beauty 
and even a certain kind of truth (although no doubt he would have winced 
at the word) in the rural and agricultural life and its rhythms, hands-on 
approach, and pastoral lifestyle and this sensibility runs throughout his 
work. For example, Heidegger’s first post-World War II book, entitled 
Holzwege (translated in 2002 as Off the Beaten Path). Its prolegomenon reads, 
‘Wood’ is an old name for forest. In the wood there are paths, 
mostly overgrown, that come to an abrupt stop where the 
wood is untrodden.   
They are called Holzwege.
Each goes its separate way, though within the same forest. 
It often appears as if one is identical to another. But it only 
appears so. Woodcutters and forest keepers know these 
paths. They know what it means to be on a Holzweg. (xiii) 
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It is not without credibility to say that this passage could have appeared in 
The Meadow—the tone is very similar. But before we return to Galvin just 
yet, let us look a bit at the later Heidegger. 
In the essays “Building Dwelling Thinking,” “On the Origin of the 
Work of Art,” “The Question Concerning Technology,” “The Age of the 
World Picture,” and the “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger develops 
thought further partly in response to the problems posed by his attempt 
to both ontologize and critique modernity as well as very possibly, as 
Jürgen Habermas proposes, in response to his own complicity with and 
endorsement of National Socialism. Following Albert Borgmann again, 
Heidegger gives up on an ahistorical ontology of Being (i.e. radicality) and 
shifts to a notion of epochal Being. That is, and this is particularly evident 
in “Question Concerning Technology” and “Origin of the Work of Art,” 
Heidegger still thinks that the proper way to access the question of Being is 
through Dasein’s being-in-the-world, but he acknowledges that this world, 
in its culture or, to use Borgmann’s term its general dispensation, we might 
say ideology, changes. While Heidegger abandons terms “authenticity” 
and “inauthenticity” in these later works, the sensibility underlying the 
use of these terms is not only still present, but stronger than ever. “The 
Question Concerning Technology” is primarily concerned with redefining 
technology as not instrumental in the sense that it helps us to do things, 
but as a framework or “enframing” dispensation toward the world 
which alienates us from Being-in-the-world as we ought to be. Instead of 
“disclosing” or “unconcealing” the worldhood of the world, technology and 
modern life “conceal” and obscure and, in fact, destroy authentic Being. 
Modern life itself therefore is inauthentic, although again he no longer uses 
the term, not only because it is alienated from a traditional, right relation to 
the world but because it actively hides that relation.
In The Meadow then, like S&Z, the authentic right relation comes through 
work and through struggle. The men Galvin writes about have “learned 
the recitations of the seasons and the repetitive work that seasons require” 
(4). The example of the displaced App’s alcoholic son Ray cutting wood to 
“earn” his much needed morning drink—he woke with alcoholic tremors—
serves a useful example of the value of work in The Meadow. Galvin writes, 
“Ray figured if he hauled a load of firewood in and split it for the kitchen 
stove, that would be worth a drink, maybe even in Margie’s eyes” (145). 
Even Ray, the inveterate drunkard who so powerfully contrasts with Lyle’s 
quasi-heroic fastidiousness, knows the authentic value of work. Galvin 
portrays the alcoholic Ray, normally the sort of character seen as hopelessly 
degenerate, as a man who needs to earn his drink through the justification 
of work. Ray could have just taken the drink—his wife is not yet awake—
but chooses not to. Instead he must engage in a valorized practice, a useful, 
honest task in order to allow himself to satisfy his addiction, his physical 
need. Margie, Ray’s wife, is used as the rhetorical justification for the need 
to do this work, but in fact it is Ray’s relationship to work showing itself 
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here. That relationship exemplifies the notion so central to the novel that 
despite the difficulty of living in this corner of Wyoming, there is a “right” 
way to live one that is demonstrated by many, if not all, of the characters 
in the text. Compare this valorization of work found in The Meadow to 
Heidegger’s discussion of Van Gogh’s peasant shoes in “The Origin of the 
Work of Art.”11 Both Galvin and Heidegger relentlessly valorize a rural 
model of “honest” work; work that is different from a modern conception 
of work in that it is both toilsome and deeply responsible; it is entirely 
connected. For Heidegger, the imagined peasant woman is authentic being 
in practice and it is no coincidence that this picture is romantic and pre-
modern. And this would seem to be exactly the model of authentic life in 
the West that Galvin too romanticizes and eulogizes in The Meadow.
Authenticity and Its Discontents: Ferris as Foil and Objections to 
the Discourse of Authenticity 
As noted above though, a few characters typify either a partial or 
total absence of this kind of Heideggerian authenticity. One of these is 
Oscar Marsh. Marsh, while he is not lambasted in way Ferris will be, is 
counterpoised to Lyle and Ray early in the novel. Marsh, Galvin writes, “is 
more of a classic kind of Wyoming rancher [than Lyle]. Besides everything 
else that means, it means if it moves he shoots it” (18). Lyle and Ray, on the 
other hand, have respect for even “the vermin” of the West: coyote and 
beaver. Early in The Meadow Lyle and Ray discuss the virtues (primarily 
toughness) of the coyote, and the supposed intelligence of a beaver. This 
discussion, presumably one that “classic Wyoming ranchers” who are 
hostile to coyotes would not have, serves to indicate that Lyle and Ray are 
authentic bearers of the right relation who manifest a deep respect for nature 
even in its most frustrating aspects. Oscar on the other hand has very little 
such respect; he takes pleasure in destruction of such “vermin.” He is not 
utterly hopeless though; he too admires the toughness of a coyote, namely 
a two-legged one that he has, of course killed: “Oscar said if he’d known 
that old boy was missing two legs and still getting along, he didn’t know 
whether he would have shot him or not” (18). The toughness of coyotes 
is anthropomorphized into a mirror image of the toughness of the people 
who live near Sheep Creek, and even this “classic Wyoming rancher” has 
to respect toughness—even if it appears in an animal despised by ranchers. 
So while Marsh may be a bit more destructive and “modern” than Lyle, 
his closeness to the land seems to have produced at least a modicum of 
authenticity.
But Lyle and his authenticity need a foil for contrast. That foil is none 
other Ferris, who is the ne plus ultra of the failure of right relation and of 
authenticity. Unlike Marsh, Ferris, whose first name is never given, has no 
redeeming qualities. In the chapter directly before Galvin introduces him, 
Ferris’ presence is foreshadowed and not subtlety. In a discussion between 
Ray, Jim, and the narrator concerning the coming sale of parcels of land 
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near their homes Ray says, “You’ve got to realize. And so do I. You own 
a whole section, and these people [an interesting phrase] that are fixing to 
ruin this country just want their own personal little piece of heaven. We 
gotta move over and let ‘em in. You’ve got your section. You’ve got your 
memories of the used-to-be same as I do, and they can’t squat on that” (89). 
To this Jim responds, “It’ll be a country of club for white trash” (89-90). This 
response is instructive for the current analysis. While the rueful elegy that 
Ray and Jim are engaging in here seems to be a common one—indeed there 
are few among us who have not felt that some place we consider special is 
being or has been ruined by growth—in the framework of The Meadow the 
sentiment in question ties directly into the sense of authenticity. On display 
is an unresolved chauvinism between the “us” of Lyle, Frank, Ray, and Jim 
and the “them” of, in particular, Ferris, a chauvinism that will prove very 
interesting. We discover elsewhere in the novel that Jim’s family are relative 
newcomers to the place of The Meadow, but they are well-established in 
terms of authenticity presumably because they are more like Lyle than 
like Marsh. The point is, and it is a vital one that will allow a transition to 
another phase of analysis, that one’s authenticity has little or nothing to do 
with how long one has been in a place. So while the sales of private parcels 
being debated above heralds new arrivals, it is not just the newness that is 
the problem. These people will not even be, Ray seems to say, capable of the 
kind of right relation that Lyle personifies. And it is Ferris who illustrates 
this terrible truth. 
Ferris first appears on page 92, in a passage narrated not in Jim’s voice 
but instead as if Lyle were speaking. This marks the first example of a 
pattern that will recur throughout in which most of material devoted to 
Ferris comes out of the mouths of characters, often Lyle’s in particular, rather 
than Jim’s. This strategy lends Galvin’s critique itself a certain authenticity 
of its own. Rather than having the narrator rant at us about how awful 
Ferris is, a rhetorical choice that could easily undermine our faith in the 
veracity and decency of the narrative voice and thus of the character Jim, 
we get descriptions and impressions of Ferris from other well-liked main 
characters. Ferris is an interloper, a newcomer, a lot buyer, a settler of 
sorts. The first time we get an account of Ferris’ “spread,” Lyle sarcastically 
describes the “little piece of heaven”— a forty acre lot on top of an arid, 
windswept hillside covered in dilapidated moving trailers—by saying “The 
trailers were overfilled with junk, mostly old appliances—washers, dryer, 
refrigerators, freezers—all mixed in with more nondescript pieces of white 
enameled sheet metal—shower stalls, possibly—and auto body parts” (92). 
Lyle ironically describes Ferris’ “new country estate” (92) as “a treeless, 
waterless ridge top that would be a sure-enough wind tunnel in the three 
month’s time, at least five miles from the nearest source of electricity that 
could power any of those appliances even if they could have been fixed 
or used someday” (92-93) and as “forty acres of exactly nothing” (93). He 
concludes with an appropriate phrase with which the reader no doubt 
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identifies, and which coincidentally resonates with a comment Heidegger 
makes in his final interview, “God help us.”12 Ferris’ inability to understand 
both the land itself and what it can and cannot provide will become of 
much importance later in The Meadow, and it is key to our sense of Ferris’ 
inauthentic way of being.
Ferris makes his next substantive appearance in yet another passage 
narrated by Lyle. In this case, Ferris comes to Lyle’s door to ask for help in 
getting his broken down truck started. Ferris asks for jumper cables, but 
of course without another car he cannot jump his pickup. Lyle inquires 
as to what the problem is, notes that it is unlikely that a jump start will do 
the job, and gets effectively hijacked into helping Ferris. They go to Ferris’ 
dilapidated pickup, and when Lyle attempts to jumpstart Ferris’ vehicle, 
Ferris refuses to turn his ignition. As Lyle says, “I yelled for him to start it, 
but he just smiled and said it wasn’t ready, at which point I understood that 
his battery was indeed dead, his generator shot, that he knew it perfectly 
well, and that he intended not to jump start his truck, but to charge his 
battery off of mine at the risk of melting not only the cables, but the wiring 
in both vehicles” (112). In addition to this bit of dastardry, Ferris is party to 
perhaps even greater sin in that he has married a very ugly woman. Again 
in Lyle’s words, 
Then I caught sight of the most chilling vision of all. Sitting 
stock-still in the backseat was the hulking form of an 
enormous woman, possibly the ugliest woman I ever seen in 
my life. She had a pronounced moustache and her eyebrows 
were a straight thick line like a piece of greasy rope stuck to 
her forehead. Her hair was curly black and all sprangled out, 
and she had on this tiny straw cowboy hat that looked like 
she must have screwed it on. The look in her eyes said, “If 
you address one word to me I’ll tear your head off and suck 
out your guts.” (111)
While we can certainly enjoy Galvin’s tour-de-force jocosity, this passage is 
just another example of Ferris’ lack of authenticity; it is no different from 
his theft of Lyle’s assistance and battery life. In the case of the battery Ferris 
acts in direct contradiction to the appropriate moral code of the novel as 
it is illustrated by Lyle’s fence repair for a neighbor. Ferris is two-faced, 
dishonest, and exploitative. He either cannot or chooses not to respect or 
honor the land or the culture valorized in the book. His hideous wife may 
be seen in this light as well—in being married to a hideous woman, Ferris 
perverts the right relation on a human level. Men in the West are, of course, 
supposed to marry wild, strong, beautiful women!
In pages 132-138, the Ferris saga comes to a close. “Ferris became the 
most popular topic of conversation around coffee tables in ranch kitchens 
throughout Albany County,” Lyle tells us (132). This is due not primarily to 
“the aggressively sorry poverty he [Ferris] lived in,” but rather, “The real 
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topic of speculation was where did he get all them horses and how did 
he expect to keep them on forty acres of ridgetop with no water” (ibid). 
We then find out that in addition to insulting authentic living with his life 
of squalor, Ferris is also boarding horses for city-dwellers, but he cannot 
water or feed them because his land is too barren and he is too cheap. In 
the following six pages, we find that Ferris is letting the horses run free into 
others’ land. He then abandons the animals in the winter, leaving them 
to die of a charming mix of starvation, thirst, and hypothermia. Ferris’ 
cruelty seems unbounded here, and in fact we learn that he has “been 
brought up on rape charges two or three times in Collins and had gotten 
off each time” (136). The latter is clearly not an example of Galvin’s mastery 
of understatement. In spite of this, and maybe even because of its heavy-
handedness, the section is important. 
If Lyle is the personification of the authentic right relation, Ferris is an 
object lesson in inauthenticity. He either has no regard or no knowledge of 
the land. His very presence is an affront to this right relation; he tries to live 
where Galvin might say that no one is meant to live, whatever that means. 
As we have seen Ferris exhibits a laundry list of behaviors that fly in the 
face of the right relation: squalor, waste, deception, cruelty, exploitation, 
lack of respect for nature and domestic animals and on and on. Galvin 
none too delicately shows that living in an inauthentic manner is not only 
disgusting but that it is an indignity that one suffers upon the land, his 
or her neighbors, and perhaps even upon the world as a whole. It is the 
presence of Ferris then that as a foil that brings Lyle’s authenticity to the 
fore. This effect is, if not precisely dialectical, certainly one of the distinction 
making the difference. This observation is perhaps obvious upon even a 
quick reading of The Meadow. But Ferris may be something other than merely 
a foil, or to put it more clearly the relationship between Lyle’s authenticity 
and Ferris’ inauthenticity may have repercussions that are both wider and 
more specific than we have heretofore seen.
Thus far we have seen that both Galvin and Heidegger share a certain 
ruralist pre-modern sense of authenticity as well as a disdain for modern 
inauthenticity. Both seem to posit the idea that one can and should live in 
a right relation to the world, to nature, through work despite the difficulty 
of doing so in the modern world. This is, of course, a normative claim 
that both use to critique the modern way of doing things. In the writings 
of Heidegger and in The Meadow then the authentic life is contrasted to 
modern objectification, consumption, waste, environmental destruction, 
cruelty to animals and the like. I think Heidegger would find comfort in 
Galvin’s statement about Lyle with which we began with, “He lived so close 
to the real world it almost let him in” (4). But we know that these kinds 
of valorizations of the rural, the only territory in which the right relation 
appears to be possible, are deeply ideological to their respective cores. 
Raymond Williams’ The Country and the City makes perhaps the first 
and most important analysis of ruralism as ideology through a historical 
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study of the pastoral in British literature. Williams’ main claim is that the 
pastoral mode, originally more of a formal device, evolved into a view of 
the country as the pre-capitalist past while the city tends to represent a 
modern, capitalist alienation. Williams writes that “[p]eople have often 
said ‘the city’ when they meant capitalism or bureaucracy or centralised 
power, while ‘the country,’ as we have seen, has at times meant everything 
from independence to deprivation, and from the powers of an active 
imagination to a form of release from consciousness” (291). The force of 
Williams’ argument, one that has developed since, is that the country/city 
dichotomy conceals the material mode of production called capitalism and 
its very real social implications. My interest here is not in his economic 
materialism but with the ideological implications of authenticity as such. 
For Williams, the pastoral plays out “a real conflict of interest, between 
those settled on the land and those settled in the city, which continually 
defined itself in the shifting economy of the time, [that] could be made the 
basis of an ideology, in which an innocent and traditional order was being 
invaded and destroyed by a new and more ruthless order” (49). For the 
purposes of this discussion, Williams’ “new and more ruthless order” can 
be understood to be modernity, as it is in Heidegger, The Meadow and as it is 
developed by philosophers like Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor, while 
the “innocent and traditional order” is of course nostalgia for the past, for 
authentic placed-ness. 
So when Williams writes that “on the country has gathered the idea of 
a natural way of life: of peace, innocence, and simple virtue” (1) this point 
easily applies to The Meadow and to what I have called Heidegger’s ruralist 
sensibility. In both the “natural way of life,” the right relation, is indeed 
inscribed deeply onto the country. Of course the country Heidegger writes 
and thinks about is not the same as Galvin’s. Nonetheless, the similarities 
in the symbolic weight that has accrued to nature and the right relation 
in both are evident. Williams subjects this symbolic weight to analysis, 
something that both Galvin and Heidegger fail to do in important ways. 
Williams notes, “What we can see happening… is the conversion of 
conventional pastoral into a localised dream and then, increasingly, in the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, into what can be offered as 
a description and thence an idealisation of actual English country life and 
its social and economic relations” (26). This idealization of actual country 
life is exactly what I argue is occurring in Galvin and Heidegger. Heidegger 
engages in an idealization of actual German country life and Galvin does 
so with ranching life in Wyoming. And both are responses to and critique 
of modernity. 
Roberto Maria Dainotto works this out in his “‘All the Regions Do 
Smilingly Revolt’: The Literature of Place and Region.” Dainotto’s work 
follows Williams’ but stops short of Williams’ historical materialism. In fact, 
Dainotto’s article is more concerned with regional literature’s nationalist 
undercurrents. He writes,
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As a spatial metaphor, the binary region/center proposes 
naïve polarizations between nature and culture, rustic 
and industrial life, authentic and imagined communities, 
marginalized region and marginalizing national center. It is 
in this reevaluation of notions of authenticity, of natural and 
organic community, that I see regionalism as an attempt to 
revive some particularly nationalist ideals by passing them 
off as ‘new’ regionalist ones. (488)
Dainotto disambiguates regionalism from what he terms “postcolonial 
and multicultural discourses,” the idea being that while regionalism and 
postcolonial discourses “share many of the [same] concerns” (491), they are 
ideologically opposed. Dainotto draws on the same notions of nostalgia 
and romance as Williams does, connecting the past with tradition and 
authenticity. He writes that in regionalist work, like Galvin’s and like 
Heidegger’s, “The past becomes a place—a region about which we can 
make studies and write novels and that we can bring back, ideally, in our 
undesirable present as a moral prescription” (493). Dainotto even goes so 
far as to claim that “there can be little doubt that a nostalgia for a sense 
of lost purity is at work behind the fantasy of the regionalist cure” (503). 
He is absolutely correct about the connection between regionalism and its 
accounts of authentic being and nationalist urges.
Authentic Whiteness in the West: The Settler-Colonialism and 
“The Indian” 
And it is to nationalism and related topics that I now turn. Of course 
Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism in the 1920s and 1930s 
is well known and the depth of that involvement is only becoming clearer 
with time. The nationalistic aspect of his thought is present in much of his 
work, even when that nationalism is not clearly coterminous with Nazism.13 
But we might struggle a bit to make similarly damning case for The Meadow. 
While the novel clearly broadcasts its debt to the so-called cowboy myth, 
a myth that Richard Slotkin, to name only one scholar, has shown to be 
deeply nationalist, it is not clear how an American text published in 1993 
could be working through any pressing nationalist concerns. Is The Meadow 
simply reiterating the reactionary legacy of the cowboy myth (think of John 
Ford Westerns), a trope that certainly persists and structures discourse and 
practice in the Western United States but that is increasingly irrelevant on 
the broader scale of American society? There is of course some of this kind 
of thing in The Meadow, as there is in many of the other self-consciously 
“Western” texts of the mid to late twentieth century, some of which I 
mentioned at the beginning of this essay. But there is something else as 
well going here, an active if perhaps subconscious engagement with the 
logic of what Patrick Wolfe and others have termed settler-colonialism, a 
persistent logic that continues to iterate itself over and over again in settler 
society. It is here then that we can turn toward an aspect of The Meadow that 
Journal of Contemporary Thought100
can only be called its present absence, and an intensely telling one at that. 
I speak of course of the necessary other of the mythical cowboy. I speak of 
course of “the Indian.”
The Meadow, like many other canonical or quasi-canonical “Western” 
texts, is not particularly concerned with the issue of race. Indeed if it is 
the case, as it is argued in Critical Whiteness Studies and related fields, 
that one of the markers of whiteness is that fact that it has the privilege of 
being “unmarked” or “invisible,”14 we see just this on display to varying 
degrees in many Western texts. But the unspoken assumption of whiteness 
is particularly striking in The Meadow. There is, it would seem, simply no 
need for Galvin to mention the race of most of the characters because it is 
nearly inconceivable that they would be anything other than white. While 
the history of the Western U.S. is itself marked by a great deal of racial 
strife involving conflicts between white settlers and all manner of persons 
of color, it is particularly striking that Galvin’s book, which plays into the 
mythos of the Wild West that Handley and Lewis note, makes no notable 
mention of Indigenous persons. Unlike similar semi-autobiographical 
texts set in the West that make passing, although often very anxious and 
problematic, acknowledgement of American Indians (Doig’s This House of 
Sky, Blunt’s Breaking Clean, Williams’ Refuge) The Meadow is silent on the 
topic.15 But despite the absence of Indigenous persons in the text, it is 
clear enough that in contrast a certain kind of indigeneity is very a much 
a part of Galvin’s notion of an authentic right relation. Ferris, whom we 
must assume is white, is as we have seen unable to understand this place 
precisely because he is an interloper, a settler even, who does not see the 
land in the same way as the “indigenous” Lyle does. The “white trash” 
Ferris is a classic redneck—destructive, exploitive—even if he does come 
from the relatively urbane state of California.  
Interestingly, though, Galvin’s depiction of Ferris as the wasteful, cruel, 
and destructive foil to Lyle’s authentic right (and perhaps white) relation 
paints Ferris in terms of what we might call, along with Hayden White, the 
ignoble savage, or at least as a variation of that trope. Here is an instructive 
passage on one persistent trait of the ignoble savage from Polish ethnologist 
and missionary Martin Gusinde’s study of the Yaghan people of Tierra del 
Fuego found in Marshall Sahlins’ seminal Stone Age Economics: 
[The Yaghan, or as Guside calls them the Yamana] do not 
know how to take care of their belongings. No one dreams of 
putting them in order, folding them, drying or cleaning them, 
hanging them up, or putting them in a neat pile. If they are 
looking for some particular thing, they rummage carelessly 
through the hodgepodge of trifles in little baskets. Larger 
objects that are piled up in a heap in the hut are dragged 
hither and yon with no regard for the damage that might be 
done them. The European observer has the impression that these 
Indians place no value whatever on their utensils and that have 
completely forgotten the effort it took to make them…. A European 
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is likely to shake his head at the boundless indifference of 
these people who drag brand-new objects, precious clothing, 
fresh provisions, and valuable items through thick mud, or 
abandon them to their swift destruction by children or dogs…. 
[T]hey are completely indifferent to material possessions. 
(Gusinde qtd. in Sahlins 12-13) [Emphasis added]
One can almost hear the paternal frustration in Gusinde’s voice here, 
a frustration stemming from his perception of Yaghan waste and 
irresponsibility. As White points out regarding the necessity of the trope 
of the ignoble savage for the noble savage, “the European” is essentially 
defined by the “savage” in the above passage. Here that definition is not 
racial, although the rhetoric of “savagery” is of course always already raced. 
Instead the “savage” is defined by her irresponsibility and wastefulness, 
which in turn indicates that “the European” must be defined in part by 
her responsibility and her respect for material possessions. What we see 
in Gusinde’s account of the Yaghan is the initial logic of settler-colonialism. 
Wolfe argues that this logic underlies the account of the ignoble savage, 
although he does not use the phrase. According to Wolfe the ignoble, 
wasteful Indigenous person Indian is “typically represented as unsettled, 
nomadic, rootless” and this characterization is used by settlers to justify 
expansion (396). Indigenous land is desired by settler-colonists for 
agriculture, “forestry, fishing, pastoralism, and mining” (395). Of these 
agriculture and pastoralism, the very same pastoralism we see in the 
ranchers of The Meadow, operate on “a rational means/ends calculus that 
is vouchsafing its own reproduction, generating capital into a future in 
which it repeats itself ” (ibid). Settler-colonialism then turns “agriculture 
[and in the Western U.S., pastoralism in the form of ranching], with its life-
sustaining connectedness to land” into “a potent symbol of settler-colonial 
identity” (396), an identity which is in contrast to the unsettled, nomadic and 
wasteful ignoble savage who supposedly treats her land like she treats her 
material possessions, letting it lie fallow, unmanaged, and unproductive.16 
And indeed, the fact that numerous Western North American Indian tribes 
were at least partially seasonally nomadic and thus supposedly “unsettled” 
could be, and was, used as a justification for settler-colonial land grabs, 
even if that justification was—as Wolfe notes—often provided well after the 
actual fact of seizure, displacement, and genocide. This kind of justification 
and its related concepts like stewardship can profitably be seen as tied to a 
theory of “wise use” avant la lettre, a point of view that reveals the policy of 
wise use itself to have roots in the logic of settler-colonialism.
The Meadow of course takes place in the late twentieth century, long after 
settler-colonial discourse of something like wise use has helped to serve 
its purpose of, as Wolfe puts it in the title of the essay upon which I am 
drawing, the elimination of the native in the American West. Rather than 
exhibiting itself in an active mode that might enable the seizure of lands 
then, the anger that Jim, Lyle and others feel for Ferris is one of passive 
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resentment that is meant to be indicative of the changes occurring in the 
U.S. West during the late twentieth century. That resentment may resemble 
the logic of settler-colonialism, but the fact that all of the characters in The 
Meadow are white surely indicates that Galvin’s notion of authenticity is 
little more than a faint echo, a vestigial remnant, rather than a so-called 
return of the repressed. And of course the problem with Ferris is not that 
he is nomadic but that he is settled, but he is settled in the wrong way. He 
is a settler, not a native! It would seem very odd indeed then to claim that 
the language used to describe him should be understood in terms of the 
trope of the ignoble savage. And yet, that is the language we have even 
if at first blush it seems not to map onto this discourse well. What it does 
map well onto, though, is a settler-colonial evolution of the hoary ignoble 
savage, a modernized iteration of that unfortunate trope that serves to 
justify continued colonial occupation of Indigenous territories: the trope of 
the despised and degraded “reservation Indian.”
Let us look at an early example of the discourse about supposed 
Indigenous “savagery” transforming into that of the debased “reservation 
Indian.” There is perhaps no better taxonomy of white tropes of “the 
Indian” than that found in Reverend Albert Keiser’s 1922 Lutheran Mission 
Work Among the American Indians: 
There naturally appears a great diversity in the description 
of the Indian. First we have that noble figure of romance 
with his admirable characteristics, largely a creation of the 
imagination. The other extreme we meet in the opinion of 
the colonial pioneer, who wished for his opponent a resting 
place under the sod. And descriptions have made known in 
late years the Reservation Indian, dirty, lazy, and shiftless. As 
a matter of fact, all these characterizations are generalizations 
which ignore the marked differences which exist between 
the various tribes and under changing circumstances. (10)
Keiser would seem to have quite a liberal view here, at least for 1922, one 
that acknowledges that these views of “the Indian” are stereotypical. But of 
course he must go on:
However, it must be admitted that the Indian was a savage, 
with the virtues and the vices of the same. Under the 
degenerating influence of the whites his many admirable traits 
were overshadowed by the development of the baser instincts. In 
time not only his outward condition, but also his character 
underwent a marked change by force of circumstances. (ibid) 
[Emphasis added]
A better account of the transformation from the trope of the ignoble 
savage to the “reservation Indian” could not be hoped for. The “reservation 
Indian” is, of course, worse than a savage. She is the most corrupted kind 
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of human being, one who is—as we can see in Keiser’s words—no longer 
even in authentic relation with her own “savagery.” As such, even Keiser’s 
condemnation of white “influence” and the guilt it would seem to entail 
indicates a variation of what is called, after Melville’s The Confidence-Man, 
“the metaphysics of Indian hating.”
That metaphysics has by the time of the mid twentieth century taken 
on a new valence. In the reservation era, the trope of the “reservation 
Indian” no longer allows Indigenous peoples to be seen even as Keiser puts 
it “savages.” They themselves are now the vestigial presence, degraded and 
perhaps hopeless wastrels living in squalor. As a result, the picture of the 
ignoble savage that in some sense helped settlers to displace and eliminate 
American Indians in all manner of horrific ways loses its relevance and is 
replaced by its flipside: the fully romanticized view of the ultimate noble 
savage—the “magical,” and of course necessarily vanished, Indian. The 
magical Indian, of course, lived in perfect “harmony with the land” and “used 
every part of the animal” she killed. We needn’t waste time rehashing the 
obvious point that the magical Indian is just as problematic and damaging 
a stereotype as is the reservation Indian or the ignoble savage. Let us note 
instead that the magical, and therefore invisible, Indian is nothing less than 
the avatar of the authentic relation; she is the paradigmatic example of the 
right relation. And this fact would seem to have an important bearing on 
The Meadow’s dichotomy of authenticity and inauthenticity. 
The Return of the Repressed and the White “Indian”
One of the deeply cruel ironies of settler-colonialism is that even after 
it has affected its scorched earth policy on Indigenous peoples it has not 
finished with them. As Wolfe writes, “[o]n the one hand, settler society 
required the practical elimination of the natives to establish itself on their 
territory. On the symbolic level, however, settler society subsequently 
sought to recuperate indigeneity in order to express its difference—and, 
accordingly, its independence—from the mother country” (389). And it is 
here that we can see the remains of the nationalist valences of the dichotomy 
of authenticity and inauthenticity found in Heidegger in the trope of the 
authentic settler-colonist. There is perhaps no more striking example of this 
effect than the cultural appropriation of Northwest Pacific Coast Indian 
iconography in western Washington State, British Columbia, and Alaska. 
But the point is, according to Wolfe, that “[the logic of] elimination refers to 
more than the summary liquidation of indigenous people though it includes 
that. In its positive aspect, the logic of elimination marks a return whereby 
the native repressed continues to structure settler-colonial society” (390; 
emphasis added). We might object to the use of the adjective “positive” 
here but that objection does not dull Wolfe’s crucial insight—that the logic 
of elimination in settler-colonialism includes what can only be called a 
spectral return of that which, and those who have, been eliminated. And 
this point in turn explains a great deal about the kind of authenticity found 
Journal of Contemporary Thought104
in The Meadow and how it differs in a key way from Heidegger’s despite its 
many similarities.
This logic of elimination and the spectral return of “the native” then 
allows us to read the central tension in The Meadow in a radically different 
way. Let us look back on Lyle, Galvin’s paragon of authenticity. Lyle 
represents the ultimate right relation; he is perfectly in tune with the 
land; he is careful and thoughtful in his engagement with the world; he 
does not waste; he is placed in a key way. Lyle, despite being white and a 
product of settler-colonialism, has an authenticity that can only be called 
“indigenous.” He can only be so, of course, because actual Indigenous 
presence has been eliminated from the meadow. That elimination is what 
allows Lyle to become authentic in the first place, to take on the role of 
an ersatz Indigenous person in the very real absence of actual Indians. 
What the elimination of the Indigenous ironically allows then is for Lyle 
to become, for all intents and purposes, himself the magical Indian. This 
is the ultimate form of cultural appropriation in late settler-colonialism, 
and it is precisely this kind of deeply disturbing shape shifting in which 
Indigeneity—originally cast as naïve and wasteful savagery, “noble” and 
otherwise—becomes idealized and romanticized, authenticated if you will, 
as a result of its near elimination. But of course the problem for settler-
colonial society in the American West is that qualifying “near” in front of 
the word elimination. In order for the magical Indian trope to establish 
itself, actual Indigenous lives, both in terms of living culture and in terms 
of the legacy of settler-colonial genocide, must not get in the way of “a 
good story.” This is why whites in the American West need the trope of 
“reservation Indian” and why that figure is so often despised. The trope of 
“reservation Indian” exists so that whites can themselves claim authentic 
placedness as magical, but crucially white, Indians. 
The central tension in The Meadow between authentic Lyle as the 
magical white Indian and the entirely inauthentic Ferris, also white, should 
and does play out this settler-colonial logic. Ferris, who would seem to 
represent the “reality” of the modern (white) world, is in fact nothing other 
than the avatar for the troublesome reality of Indigenous life after settler-
colonial seizures: the hated “reservation Indian.” Despite the absence of 
Indigenous persons and history in The Meadow then, the book is essentially 
structured by the elimination of the native, a logic that demands the latter’s 
absence and while at the same time requiring her presence. The Meadow 
“solves” this “problem” in true settler-colonial fashion by transforming 
whites into ersatz Indigenous persons. In doing so, the novel plays 
out the aporia of settler-colonialism by simultaneously and figuratively 
casting those Indians who do not have the decency to vanish as utterly 
inauthentic while at the same time idealizing the non-existent “magical” 
Indian through, always of course, whites. The Meadow takes this logic of late 
settler-colonial society to its proper extreme by displaying what can only 
be called an unconscious return of the repressed native. This is evident not 
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only in the uncanny absence of Indigenous persons in the text itself but 
also in its reliance on white settler-colonial tropes of Indigeneity to work 
through its binary of authenticity and inauthenticity. To be sure, the return 
of the native as magical Indian in The Meadow is a figurative return, one 
in which actual Indigeneity is only further eliminated. What we have in 
Galvin’s text is almost a dream logic in that it operates less on a principle of 
metaphor, in which we can pass from what is said to what is meant, than 
of shape shifting and metamorphosis. Lyle is not a metaphor for a magical 
Indian. He is a magical Indian, a de-raced Indian, a white Indian in the full 
complex depth of whiteness as anti-signifier. Finally in the authentically 
right-relationed Lyle the dream of the settler-colonist can come true. The 
white man becomes the Indian, the authentic magical Indian that only ever 
existed, where else? in the settler-colonist’s dreams.
But if Lyle’s transformation into an authentic but ersatz magical white 
Indian is a kind of dream work, Ferris’s figuration as the reservation Indian, 
should be understood on the other hand as metaphorical. The white 
man has again become the Indian here, but in Ferris’ case white tropes 
of “Indianness” have not been metamorphosed away or subsumed into 
body of the settler-colonist. In fact the reverse has occurred. To the settler-
colonist the “reservation Indian” represents deeply problematic evidence of 
the former’s logic of elimination. This of course explains hatred for actually 
existing Indians, or as some Western whites call them, “prairie niggers,” even 
as these same whites idealize the always absent magical Indian. Because 
of the way that Ferris is marked—as lazy, deceitful, wasteful, filthy, cruel 
to animals, violent, impoverished, dishonest—we cannot help but think 
of the ignoblest un-savage, the worst of the worst: the reservation Indian. 
If in Lyle’s case the white settler-colonist takes on the authentic nobility 
of the magical Indian just as he establishes his authentic “rightful” place 
in and on the land, things are different in Ferris’ case. As an inauthentic 
newcomer to the Sheep Creek area then, Ferris must be understood in 
terms of an intense guilt about the logic of elimination. What is Ferris other 
than a settler-colonist himself, one who comes not to rule but to live, to 
“erect […] a new colonial society on the expropriate land base” as Wolfe 
puts it (388)? His inability to understand the right relation to the land, what 
Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington term an “attachment to the land 
[with] a fundamentally unfamiliar form,” replays and reinscribes the initial 
genocidal moves of settler-colonialism (2). But this time it is the colonists 
themselves, like Lyle, who are threatened with displacement. And who 
threatens to displace them but the very “Indian” they understand in terms 
of her present absence? Bateman and Pilkington again:
Although the settler colonial projects were instigated in 
previous centuries, the effects are permanent and the 
process is still current. The settlers, now often second or third 
generation, consider themselves to belong to the country in 
which they were born and attempts by indigenous peoples 
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to reclaim land or assert prior ownership of resources and 
territory leads to conflict and resentment. (2)
Finally then, although it might appear that The Meadow is in contention 
for what Alexie calls with deep irony the “Great American Indian Novel” 
in which “all of the white people will be Indians and all of the Indians will 
be ghosts,” the novel falls short of this ignoble distinction. For although 
Lyle is the white magical “Indian,”—safely de-raced, idealized and de-
historicized—in casting Ferris as an ignoble reservation Indian who is at 
the very same time a settler-colonist threatening to eliminate and displace 
the “authentic” white magical “Indians,” The Meadow crucially transforms 
the white Ferris into a “real Indian:” the ignoble un-savage. The Meadow, 
whether it knows it or not, has in Ferris an “Indian” who is not at all ghostly, 
who is fully present. As the avatar of the “reservation Indian,” he embodies 
settler-colonial guilt and its consequent disdain, even repugnance, with that 
which it has tried to eliminate. Ferris then represents the post-expansion 
iteration of settler-colonial logic, and in doing so powerfully dramatizes 
the settler-colonial fear in the face of calls for Indigenous repatriation and 
reparation—calls justified not ultimately by notions of authenticity but on 
the historical fact of prior dominion and by the shameful legacies of settler-
colonialism throughout the world. 
Notes
1 See White’s “The Noble Savage Theme as Fetish” from Tropics of Discourse. 
2 We know of course that the myth of the Wild West is nothing if not a 
simulacrum.
3 See Grey’s 1989 Redeeming the Dream: Feminism, Redemption and Christian 
Traditionfor a much more sophisticated take on the right relation. Although my 
use of the phrase is not as explicitly religious as is Grey’s, there is a certain kind 
of religiosity at stake in The Meadow’s depiction of the right relation.
4 For overviews of the “Black Notebooks” and their contents see “Release 
of Heidegger’s ‘Black Notebooks’ Reignites Debate Over Nazi Ideology” by 
Paul Hockenos on The Chronicle of Higher Education website and “Heidegger’s 
Notebooks Renew Focus on Anti-Semitism” by Jennifer Schuessler in the March 
13, 2014 issue of The New York Times (also available online).
5 See Heidegger’s well-known essay “Building Dwelling Thinking” in Basic 
Writings for a detailed treatment of these matters.
6 As I note later, this relation, as ethical as it might be, is in the American 
West at least predicated on a prior removal of Indigenous peoples – forcibly 
through relocation and genocide, conceptually through tropes of “open land,” 
and legally through Chief Justice John Marshall’s so-called discovery doctrine. 
7 From “Economy”: 
I sometimes wonder that we can be so frivolous, I may almost 
say, as to attend to the gross but somewhat foreign form of 
servitude called Negro Slavery, there are so many keen and 
subtle masters that enslave both North and South. It is hard to 
have a Southern overseer; it is worse to have a Northern one; 
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but worst of all when you are the slave-driver of yourself…. 
The mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation. What is called 
resignation is confirmed desperation.” (49-50).
8 On the novel’s first page and in the context of the first dream, the reader 
is told, “The dreamer, outside this dream, has only seen Lyle ruffled once. 
That was the time his sister, Clara, put his rifle in her mouth and painted the 
roughsawn boards in his room with her brains” (9).
9 He shows this mostly clearly in his reading and critique of Descartes 
in Division I, Chapter III, Section 18 of S&Z. The idea that we are somehow 
separate from the world, that we “think therefore we are” (the cogito ergo sum of 
Descartes), that there is the mind (and its apperceptions or phenomenon) and the 
“thing as such” (Kant’s noumenon or das Ding an sich) as opposed to this mind is 
seen as radically incorrect by Heidegger.
10 For example when explaining how our directional comportment to the 
world is founded on bodily Being-in-the-world, Heidegger uses the example of 
an old-fashioned (contemporary at the time of composition of S&Z of course) 
turn-signal on a car, one that has a flag that pops up with an arrow on it. His 
discussion of tools mirrors this, choosing an artifact like a hammer for example.
11 “From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome 
tread of the worker stands forth. In the stiffly solid heaviness of the shoes there 
is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and 
ever-uniform furrows of the field, swept by a raw wind. On the leather there 
lies the dampness and saturation of the soil. Under the soles there slides the 
loneliness of the field-path as the evening declines. In the shoes there vibrates 
the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening corn and its enigmatic 
self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field” (Basic Writings 159).
12 When asked in a 1966 interview with the magazine Der Spiegelfirst 
published in 1976 after Heidegger’s death about whether individuals and/or 
philosophy might help humanity to escape “purely technological relationships,” 
Heidegger famously answers “Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten”: “Only a god 
can save us” (The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader 106-107). 
13 The question of to what degree Heidegger’s thought is infected with 
nationalist and National Social ideology is still very much under debate, 
especially now in the wake of the so-called Black Notebooks.
14 For more on this see, among others, Ruth Frankenberg’s 1993 White 
Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness and John T. Warren on 
“Whiteness and Cultural Theory: Perspectives on Research and Education” in 
1999’s Volume 31, Issue 2 of Urban Studies. 
15 I choose to use the term American Indian due largely in part to Drew 
Hayden Taylor’s short essay “Oh, Just Call Me an Indian” found in, among other 
places, Joseph Bruchac’s edited volume Returning the Gift: Poetry and Prose from 
the First North American Native Writers’ Festival (Tucson and London: University 
of Arizona Press, 1994).
16 We should note with Wolfe that this depiction often had little to do with 
the reality of Indigenous economies which often did engage in agriculture, and 
who taught Europeans how to grow beans, squash, and more. 
Journal of Contemporary Thought108
Works Cited
Abbey, Edward. “Free Speech: The Cowboy and His Cow.” One Life at a Time 
Please. New York: Holt, 1988. 9-19. Print.
Alexie, Sherman. “How to Write the Great American Indian Novel.”The Summer 
of Black Widows. New York: Hanging Loose P, 1996. 94-95. Print.
Bateman, Fiona and Lionel Pilkington Eds. Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, 
Identity, and Culture. New York: Palgrave MacMillan-St. Martin’s P, 2011. 
Print.
Borgmann, Albert. “Cosmopolitanism and Provincialism: On Heidegger’s 
Errors and Insights.” Philosophy Today 36 (1992): 131-45. Print.
––. “20th Century Continental Philosophy: Heidegger.” University of Montana, 
Missoula. Aug. – Dec. 2005. Lectures.
Cronon, William. “Introduction: In Search of Nature.” Uncommon Ground: 
Rethinking the Human Place in Nature. Ed. William Cronon. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1995. 23-56. Print.
Dainotto, Roberto Maria. “‘All the Regions Do Smilingly Revolt’: The Literature 
of Place and Region.” Critical Inquiry 22 (1996): 486-505.Print.
Doig, Ivan. This House of Sky: Landscapes of a Western Mind. New York; Harcourt, 
1978. Print.
Dreyfus, Hubert. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s “Being and 
Time, Division 1.” Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.Print.
Galvin, James. The Meadow. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1992.Print.
Grey, Mary C. Redeeming the Dream: Feminism, Redemption and Christian Tradition. 
London, SPCK, 1989. Print.
Habermas, Jurgen. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Trans. Frederick 
Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.Print.
Handley, William R. and Nathaniel Lewis, eds. True West: Authenticity and the 
American West. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004. Print.
Heidegger, Martin. Basic Writings. Ed. and trans. David Farrell Krell. San 
Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1993. Print.
––. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell, 1962. Print.
––. Off the Beaten Track. Eds. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes.
 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2002. Print.
––. “Only a God Can Save Us.” The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader. Ed. 
Richard Wollin. Cambridge, MA: The MIT P, 1993. 91-116. Print.
Keiser, Albert. Lutheran Mission Work Among the American Indians. Minneapolis; 
Augsburg, 1922. Google E-Book.
MacDonald, Bonney. “Authoring an Authentic Place: Environmental and 
Literary Stewardship in Stegner and Kittredge,” Handley and Lewis 257-
274. Print.
Sahlins, Marshall. Stone Age Economics. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1974. Print.
Slotkin, Richard. Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century 
America. New York: Atheneum, 1992. Print.
––. The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 
1800-1890.  New York: Atheneum, 1985. Print.
Taylor, Charles. Hegel. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1975. Print.
109The Return of the Repressed Native in James Galvin’s “The Meadow”
––. Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
UP, 1989. Print.
Thoreau, Henry David. Walden and Civil Disobedience. 1854. New York: Penguin, 
1983.
White, Hayden. Tropics of Discourse. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1978. Print.
Williams, Raymond.The Country and the City. New York: Oxford UP, 1973. Print.
Williams, Terry Tempest. Refuge: An Unnatural History of Family and Place. New 
York: Vintage, 1991.
Wolfe, Patrick. “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.” Journal 
of Genocide Research 8.4 (2006): 387-409. Print.
